Proton mounted a bug within the new authentication app on iOS. This may report consumer delicate TOTP secrets and techniques in plain textual content and expose multifactor authentication codes if the logs are shared.
Final week, Proton launched the brand new Proton Authenticator app, a free standalone two-factor authentication (2FA) utility for Home windows, MacOS, Linux, Android, and iOS.
This app is used to retailer multifactor authentication TOTP secrets and techniques that can be utilized to generate one-time passcodes for authentication on web sites and functions.
Over the weekend, customers posted on a now-deleted Reddit publish that that they had printed TOTP’s secrets and techniques within the debug logs of apps that had iOS variations beneath. setting > log.
“I imported my 2FA account and enabled backup and sync. At first every little thing appeared good. At one level, I modify the labels with one of many entries and simply switched the app, then learn the archive of my publish.
“I’ve come again to search out that about half of the 2FA entries are gone. It might have occurred after the label modifying, however I wasn’t 100% positive. It may have been one thing else. Both means, it disappeared with none errors or warnings.”
“I needed to do the best factor and submit a bug report. Throughout preparation, I opened a log file that the app generated, once I was considerably annoying and deeply involved.
One other commenter identified that the leakage was because of the code within the iOS app (1, 2). This provides a number of information concerning the TOTP entry to the PARAMS variable and is handed to 2 features which are used so as to add or replace the TOTP secret in your app.

When that is finished, the operate provides this information to the log entry and exposes the TOTP secret.
Proton confirmed a bug within the iOS model and stated it’s at present pinned in model 1.1.1, launched on the App Retailer about 7 hours in the past.
“Secrets and techniques usually are not despatched to the server in plain textual content, and all secret syncing is finished with end-to-end encryption. The logs are native (not despatched to the server). These secrets and techniques can be exported to the gadget to fulfill the portability necessities of GDPR information.”
“In different phrases, even when this isn’t included within the log, anybody who has entry to the gadget to retrieve these logs can get secrets and techniques. Proton encryption can’t be shielded from compromises on the a part of the gadget, so it’s outdoors the risk mannequin, so it’s all the time obligatory to guard the gadget.”
“I up to date the iOS app to vary the logging conduct, however this isn’t a vulnerability that an attacker may exploit, and if the attacker has entry to the gadget to entry the native logs, then they will get secrets and techniques anyway.
Whereas this log information can’t be exploited remotely, the priority was that if the log was shared or posted wherever to assist diagnose issues or bugs, it uncovered delicate TOTP secrets and techniques to 3rd events.
You may import these secrets and techniques into one other authentication machine and generate a one-time passcode for that account.